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INTRODUCTION: TOLERATING THE INTOLERANT
There is an uneasy alliance between our national commitment to
liberalism and our equally fundamental commitment to religious liberty.
Liberalism is a political philosophy that presumes the central importance
of individual agency in the justification of social or governmental
arrangements.1 Jeremy Waldron states this presumption as follows:
Associate Professor, Capital University Law School. L.L.M. (Jurisprudence) Columbia
Law School; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; M.A. (Philosophy) Tulane University. I
wish to thank Donald Hughes and Jessica Johnson for their insightful suggestions and comments
on this draft. I also thank Zachary Klein and Daniel Miller for their excellent research assistance
and Capital University Law School for financial support in writing this essay. Any errors that
remain are, of course, my own.
It is usually a mistake to conceive a political philosophy as a monolithic doctrine. The
political philosophy of "liberalism" is no different. Instead, it is more like a presumptive
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[L]iberals are committed to a conception of freedom and of respect for
the capacities and the agency of individual men and women,
and... these commitments generate a requirement that all aspects of the
social world should either be made acceptable or be capable of being
made acceptable to every last individual.
2
Unfettered religious practice, on the other hand, is not necessarily
committed to the central importance of individual agency, especially when
that agency might jeopardize the salvation of the individual or the
salvation of others. Religious lifestyles are thereby often characterized as
lifestyles prone to the illiberal use of government, forcing individuals to
accept some tenet or behavior they would not accept if given the choice.
3
It is all the more surprising, therefore, that liberalism, whatever its other
alleged shortcomings, is properly recognized for its early and ardent stand
4in protecting religious practice. Continuing in the liberal tradition, our
orientation or stance taken to questions of governmental arrangements and the role of individuals
within these arrangements. As we shall see, there can be significant differences of opinion and
viewpoint, different "brands" if you will, within the presumptive orientation. Cf Steven D.
Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 306 n.4 (1990) ("Despite the
disagreement as to the specific content of 'liberalism,' there is no obviously preferable
replacement for the term as a description of a family of political ideas and practices that
emphasize the importance of individual freedom and of preserving space for personal autonomy
free from collective control.").
2 JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 36-37 (1993).
3 See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 690 (1993) ("[A] liberal democracy must make special
efforts to prevent religious domination of one group by another... [because] the authority
structure common in many religions can make a desire to dominate other groups natural and can
provide a rationale for it."); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 373 (1995) (characterizing religious lifestyles by
their "resistance to persuasion ... and resistance to compromise-mak[ing] religious factions an
especially virulent threat to the vigor of republican politics"); William P. Marshall, The Other
Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 859 (1993) (maintaining that if religion is "unleashed as
a political force" it may "lead to a particularly acrimonious divisiveness among different
religions" and may be "easily transformed into movements of intolerance, repression, hate, and
persecution"). Even the Supreme Court on occasion has engaged in an illiberal characterization
of religion:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are
normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but
political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect. The potential divisiveness of such conflict
is a threat to the normal political process.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citations omitted).
4 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (The Liberal Arts Press 2d
ed. 1955) (1689) [hereinafter FIRST LETTER]; JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (1690), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 59-137 (1963); JOHN LOCKE,
A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION (1690), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 139-546
(1963); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENC'D PRINTING
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nation's earliest legal pronouncements were firmly committed to
protecting, at least in principle, if not in fact, each person's religion.5
Indeed, it would be difficult to make any meaningful sense of the language
6of the First Amendment if this were not the case. And therein lies the
rub--our commitment to liberalism requires us to tolerate religious
lifestyles that do not necessarily tolerate the lifestyles of others.
Assuming religious lifestyles are properly characterized as illiberal
lifestyles, 7 conflict arises where our commitment to individual agency
insists that we tolerate the illiberal lifestyles of others. Faced with such
conflict, we have to ask ourselves the following difficult question: At
what point do the failures of religious lifestyles to commit to a respect for
individual agency 8 strip those lifestyles of their presumed protection under
the principle of liberalism? At what point can, and should, we stop
tolerating the intolerant?
This is a fundamental question for a liberal society, such as ours, and
it generates the corollary question of the proper scope of religious
toleration in a society committed to liberalism. This question brings into
proper focus the central concern of the Religion Clauses, namely religious
tolerance, and provides us with a yardstick to gauge the adequacy of the
Supreme Court's varying interpretations of these clauses.9 The primary
(1644), reprinted in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 3-32 (Milton Mayer ed., Oceana Publ'ns
1957).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof....").
7 But see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious
Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 639, 642
(1999) (arguing against the view that religious lifestyles are inherently intolerant, or at least more
intolerant than nonreligious lifestyles, and claiming that "[r]eligious citizens and groups are very
much like other ideologically oriented citizens and groups, for good and for ill, and are properly
subject to no limitations on democratic participation that are not equally applicable to others").
8 Of course, from within the alleged intolerant perspective, a commitment to the individual
may arguably be best protected by denying that individual agency over her actions, for example,
if such denial would lead to her salvation.
9 Accordingly, I join the growing list of commentators who contend that the Supreme
Court's recent shift to the even-handed treatment of religion and non-religion-what the Court
terms "neutrality"--as the central value protected by the Religion Clauses, is misguided. See,
e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles,
Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 498-531 (2004) (providing a
sustained critique of the Court's current concept of religious neutrality); Smith, supra note 1, at
353-56 (same); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REV. 993, 1016 (1990) (arguing for the right to exemptions for
religious conduct then stating that "[t]he right to exemptions for religious conduct is more easily
explained in terms of religious liberty than in terms of neutrality"); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 134-68 (1992) (questioning
whether the current Court's "evenhanded" analysis is truly "neutral" and suggesting instead that
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task of this essay is to suggest where the line between governmental
tolerance and intolerance of religious lifestyles should be drawn and,
thereby, to outline the proper contours of our notion of religious liberty.' 0
Liberals of different stripe provide us with different answers to the
question of religious tolerance. We shall look in some detail at two
answers provided by John Locke and John Stuart Mill. We shall see that
our current national commitment is to a "thin" conception of religious
liberty,1 which protects religious belief, but not religious practice-a
conception of religious liberty we inherit primarily from the writings of
John Locke.12 This thin conception of religious tolerance has taken two
forms: (1) an early form that essentially required government to stay out
of religious matters altogether and created an unnecessary tension between
the free exercise and the disestablishment of religion; 3 and (2) a recent
form that allows for the inclusion of religious matters in the polity, but
only on the condition that religious and nonreligious matters are regulated
even-handedly, effectively eviscerating the free exercise of religion. 14  I
it is slanted towards majoritarian religions and secular decision-making). For my criticism of the
Court's recent shift to neutrality or equal treatment as the primary analytical construct for the
Religion Clauses, see infra, Part II1.
10 I do assume a fairly close and direct relationship between the amount of toleration
afforded and the amount of individual agency tolerated. The greater the tolerance afforded, the
greater the scope of individual agency tolerated, and vice versa.
11 I use the words "thin" and "thick" throughout this essay to indicate the extent and depth
of the toleration afforded. For example, if our conception of liberalism requires us only to
tolerate an individual's thoughts and feelings, but not her actions, life projects, and associations,
then the toleration is "thinner" than a commitment requiring the toleration of all these
components of individual agency. The words "weak" and "strong" are close to the meaning
intended but for the fact that they more explicitly connote moral evaluations. My usage differs
somewhat from Rawls's usage, as when he describes the primary goods selected in the original
position as based on a "thin" theory of goodness. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 60
(1971). While both our uses of "thin" imply a lack of substance or depth, my use does not imply
an underlying shared consensus as does Rawls's usage.
12 See FIRST LETTER, supra note 4.
13 The Supreme Court's early establishment jurisprudence expansively read the
Establishment Clause as preventing government from either advancing or inhibiting religion.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). During this same period, however,
the Court also read the Free Exercise Clause as requiring government to exempt religious
practice from burdensome regulations, which arguably requires government to "advance"
religion and violates the Court's disestablishment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972).
14 Perhaps in reaction to the above conflict, see supra note 13, the Court recently read the
Establishment Clause as allowing government support of religion if there is a wide class of
recipients receiving the support and if the support is for secular purposes. See, e.g., Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002). During this same period, however, the Court also
read the Free Exercise Clause as requiring government to treat religious practice just like it treats
any other secular practice. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990)
[Vol.43:367
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will explain this thin notion of toleration and why it is inadequate in Part I
of the essay.
In Part II, I will argue that there is a more adequate conception of
religious toleration available within the liberal tradition. This notion of
religious toleration is derived primarily from John Stuart Mill's work, On
Liberty.15 I hope to show that this conception of toleration avoids the main
pitfalls of the dominant understanding that we have inherited from Locke.
Finally, in Part III, I will apply these competing conceptions of
religious toleration to the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence
concerning the Religion Clauses. I hope to demonstrate that many of the
alleged problems in this area are avoided, if not solved, by shifting our
notion of religious toleration from Locke to Mill.
Before I discuss the answers presented by Locke and Mill, I must
acknowledge that the difficulties of the main task before us are heightened
by the presence of two modem social developments. First, there has been
tremendous expansion of government since our nation was founded, much
more since the time when Locke and Mill wrote.' 6  If we view the
relationship between government regulation and religious liberty as a zero-
sum game, then as government grows, religious liberty correspondingly
shrinks. On this view, the growth of government signals the effective
decline of religious freedom. As we shall see, the rise of the modem
regulatory state places extreme pressure on Locke's notion of religious
tolerance. Second, there has been a tremendous proliferation of religious
communities in our nation since our founding. 17 I will also discuss what
effect this proliferation of religious communities has on our conception of
religious tolerance. The notion of tolerance proffered here assumes that
any adequate account of the relationship between liberalism and religious
liberty must embrace these current social realities.18
(arguably eviscerating any independent protection afforded to religion by the Free Exercise
Clause); see also infra Part III (criticizing the Court's current Religion Clauses jurisprudence).
"5 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 267 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 1952) [hereinafter On Liberty].
16 See generally, Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will the Centralizing Tide of the
Twentieth Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 104-07 (2000)
(providing a brief overview of government growth in the twentieth century).
17 See MARY FARRELL BEDNAROWSKI, AMERICAN RELIGION: A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
2-4 (1984) (noting that more than 1200 different religions are practiced in the United States
today).
18 As innocuous as this claim sounds, these societal developments have effectively been
ignored by originalists in the field, and the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence in this area
often provides little evidence that it is willing to embrace them.
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I. JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration shook the political
world of the late 1600s with its bold statement supporting religious
toleration at a time when intolerance of religious choice was the norm. It
is justly praised as a tremendous advance over previous protections
afforded religion. In the late 1600s, governments coerced religious choice,
without even seeing the need to justify such coercion. Given this brutish
political climate, even Locke's failure to tolerate Catholics and Atheists is
understandable1 9 and does not gainsay his progress towards a more robust
protection of religious liberty. After Locke's argument for toleration, such
facile assumption of government power could no longer be justified. So
how did Locke propose to protect religious liberty in a climate of largely
unquestioned government coercion of religion?
A. The Realm of Religious Belief
I shall term Locke's answer to the toleration and protection of
religious liberty "thin dualism." First, we need to take a closer look at
Locke's dualism. Locke accomplished the task of protecting what he
valued as the most important component of religious liberty, religious
belief, by sharply separating the realm of religious belief from the realm of
religious practice-separating individuals' religious beliefs from their
social actions, including their religious actions. He claimed that individual
religious beliefs are absolutely immune from government regulation,
because they essentially occur in a realm (in our heads or hearts) separate
from the realm of action that includes the physical restraints of
governmental coercion. Locke wrote: "For no man can, if he would,
conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true
religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is
not faith without believing.'
20
Governmental power, on the other hand, "consists only in outward
force," and "such is the nature of the understanding that it cannot be
compelled to the belief of anything by outward force."'', This is really an
19 See FIRST LETTER, supra note 4, at 50-52. In fairness to Locke, he excluded both groups
on (arguably) secular grounds. Locke excluded Catholicism from toleration, because he believed
that Papist doctrine undermined the absolute sovereignty of secular government in the realm of
social interactions, and he excluded Atheists from toleration primarily because he believed they
would not make good citizens without a belief in God to support the making of "[p]romises,
covenants, and oaths." Id. at 52. As we shall see, such treatment of religious lifestyles is
permitted under Locke's theory if the reasons for the treatment are secular. See infra notes 27-31
and accompanying text.
20 FIRST LETrER, supra note 4, at 18 (emphasis added).
21 Id. (emphasis added).
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argument from futility or impossibility. Locke is claiming that
government coercion of religious belief is futile and impossible, because
the act of coercion and the "act" of religious belief take place in separate
ontological realms; therefore, any causal connection between them is
impossible. Locke stated that government coercion of religious belief is
"impertinent," because "penalties are no way capable to produce such
belief. It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's
opinions; which light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings
or any other outward penalties. 22 This separation of realms, which Locke
called "jurisdictions,"2 3 -an inward realm of belief, consciousness, and
thought; and an outward realm of action-is what I mean by the
assumption of dualism in Locke's theory.
To put it mildly, Locke's proposed solution for the protection of
religious belief rests upon an overly optimistic epistemology. Apply
enough pressure to the thumbscrews, for enough time, and we will begin to
believe whatever is asked of us! The findings of modern social and
behavioral science counsel a cautious skepticism concerning Locke's
understanding of the dynamics of belief. Indeed, it is arguable that our
religious beliefs, assumed by Locke to be impervious to social influence,
are as much a product of social forces as a result of individual choice.
Mill, recognizing the power of cultural forces over our beliefs, informed
the proud Christian "that the same causes which make him a Churchman in
London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. '2 4 Our
cautious skepticism concerning Locke's understanding of the dynamics of
belief is based properly on the wealth of evidence provided by the social
sciences that strongly belies his quaint optimism.
Such skepticism also spills over to an important corollary of Locke's
dualism; namely, if religious belief is immune from government coercion,
then government is acting irrationally when it attempts to coerce religious
belief. Locke stated, "the care of souls cannot belong to the civil
magistrate because his power consists only in outward force; but true and
saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind. 25
Unfortunately, if government coercion can effect religious belief, and
history is replete with evidence that it can, then we will need another
reason for preventing government coercion of religious belief than Locke's
proffered reason that such efforts are impossible.
22 Id. at 19.
23 Id. at 17.
24 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 275.
25 FIRST LETTER, supra note 4, at 18.
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B. The Realm of Government Regulation
As a consequence of his dualism, Locke placed all social action, and
more importantly for our purposes, religious practice, within the realm
susceptible to the regulatory actions of government. This move in itself is
not problematic. Indeed, religious practice does occupy the same realm as
other actions, including government actions. The difficulty is Locke's
further assumption that all actions within the realm of social action are
properly subject to, with one proviso, government control. Just as the
individual absolutely rules the realm of personal belief, the government
(essentially) rules the realm of all social interactions, including the
"outward worship '2 6 of religious practice. Locke's trade-off is, therefore,
that government can regulate, even curtail, religious practice, without
affecting the core of religious liberty, which for Locke is religious belief
However, there is one important limitation to government's regulation
of the realm of social interaction, namely, its reasons for regulation must
not be religious. For Locke, to hold otherwise is to violate the underlying
dualism. Locke wrote that "the magistrate has no power to impose by his
laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any church., 27 Locke's famous
example is animal sacrifice. The government cannot mandate that a
particular religion either partake of or discontinue animal sacrifice, if the
government's regulation is based on religious grounds.28 But government
may curtail the slaughter of animals, including religiously mandated
animal sacrifice, if it can present a secular reason for the regulation.
Locke's famous passage reads as follows:
But if peradventure such were the state of things that the interest of the
commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for
some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle that had been
destroyed by some extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the
magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves
for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the
law is not made about a religious but a political matter; nor is the
sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.
29
The impact on religious practice is somewhat mitigated in the above
example by the regulation being imposed only for a limited duration. But,
this time limitation is not necessary to the argument. Locke did not claim
that only regulations of religious practices of limited time duration are
justifiable. Locke said that if the regulation is secular, in "the interest of
26 Id. at 35.
27 Id. at 39.
28 Id. at 39-40.
29 Id. at 40.
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the commonwealth," then the regulation is justifiable, regardless of how
intrusive the regulation is to the religious practice in question. It is not the
impact of the regulation that is important; it is the rationale for the
regulation that is important. In modem terminology, government
regulation of religious practice must be "formally neutral," not directed at
regulating the practice because it is religious, but it does not have to be
"substantively neutral," meaning the effects of the regulation can
effectively extinguish the practice if it is based on secular reasons.3 °
Jeremy Waldron noted:
What matters for Locke's purposes is not coercion as such or its effects,
but the reasons that motivate it. If the reasons are religious, the coercion
is irrational. But if the reasons are economic or political, then the
argument for toleration gets no grip despite the fact that the coercion may
discriminate unequally in its consequences against a particular group.
3 1
Locke's theory provokes the question: What if government believes
it has secular reasons for regulating religious practice, but religious
adherents subject to the regulation do not agree? Note that this is simply a
recasting of our question concerning the proper scope of religious
toleration mentioned in the introduction. 32  According to Locke, the
religious adherents do not "deserve a dispensation," they must follow the
law. 3 Their only recourse is to divine compensation,34 for in the realm of
social interactions, the presumption is in favor of government. Locke
summed up his position, "[w]hatsoever is lawful in the commonwealth
cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the church," but "those things
that are.., forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to
churches in their sacred rites., 35 He concluded with the admonition that
"the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he [does] not misuse
his authority to the oppression of any church, under pretense of public
good., 36 Of course, it will be the government under Locke's theory that
decides whether an asserted public good is "pretense" or not.
30 See Laycock, supra note 9, at 999-1006 (explaining the difference between "formal" and
"substantive" neutrality).
31 WALDRON, supra note 2, at 105.
32 See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
33 See FIRST LETTER, supra note 4, at 48.
31 Id. at 49.
35 Id. at 40.
36 id.
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C. Locke 's Answer: "Thin Dualism "-Tolerate Religious Belief Not
Religious Practice
To gauge the success of Locke's answer to the question of religious
toleration, we must gauge the importance of religious practice to our
conception of religious liberty. The general implication of Locke's answer
is that the importance of individual agency lies only in the act(s) of
believing, or choosing to believe, but not in the life projects, life plans, and
social associations that result from these beliefs. While an important
component of the value we place on individual agency is constituted by
freedom of choice (belief), equally important is the value we place on
individuals' freedom to act out, and on, their beliefs. The problem with
Locke's theory is that it does not even entertain this presumption; instead,
government is presumed to have the power, and the right, to regulate all
outward actions, so long as it does not regulate them for religious reasons.
Of course, this presumption of allowing individuals to act out their beliefs
has limits. But, Locke's theory leads to the counterintuitive position that
even tolerant acts can be regulated by government, because they are acts
and thereby are within the government's proper domain. Locke's theory of
tolerance is thin indeed. Instead, the theory we seek should be able to
distinguish between tolerant acts, which should not be regulated by
government, and intolerant acts, which (arguably) should be regulated by
government. Locke's solution effectively denies individuals agency over
their actions and places that agency under a presumption of government
control. This is really no solution at all if our goal is to make government
accountable to individual agency, as a serious commitment to liberalism
would require.
Government's control over its own outward acts also causes a
problem under Locke's system, and the problem is exacerbated if we view
Locke's notion of limited government in the context of modem expanded
governments and administrative states. It only stands to reason that as
government regulation extends to more areas of social life, the potential
effects, good or ill, of government regulation also increase. Unfortunately,
the effects of government regulation on individual lifestyles, including
religious practice, play no role in Locke's notions of coercion or
tolerance.37 According to Locke, government does not have to tolerate the
objections of religious adherents, or of any other lifestyle for that matter, if
their objections are based on the effects of government regulation of their
religious practices. Such complaints, if they are to be successful, must be
based on the reasons for the regulation. The problem here is that it is
37 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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government that determines whether its reasons are properly secular or
improperly religious. It should perhaps be noted at this point again that
Locke's position is counter to a serious commitment to liberalism, a
political philosophy grounded on governmental accountability to
individual agency.
Of course, there is the possibility that enough complaining could prod
government to change the law or eventually lead to a change in
government. However, this places minorities, including religious
minorities, at a severe disadvantage because they do not possess the
political clout to change government or its laws. This is really no solution
at all if our goal is to make government more directly accountable to
individual agency, and not the other way around.
Locke is properly recognized as a major contributor to a more liberal
conception of religious toleration because protecting what individuals
think, say, and believe about religion is no mean feat. Indeed, as we shall
see, the protection of religious belief, and only religious belief, is still the
dominant conception of religious liberty under First Amendment
jurisprudence some three hundred years later. Nevertheless, Locke's
restriction of religious liberty to only the "act" of belief and his refusal to
extend the contours of religious liberty to the tolerant social acts
constituting religious practice are the reasons why I term Locke's theory of
religious toleration as a particularly thin theory of protection.
38
Locke's answer to our original question concerning how much
tolerance must be extended to religious liberty is now squarely before us.
His brand of liberalism commits us to the view that we must tolerate
intolerant, as well as tolerant, religious beliefs, because any attempt to
regulate belief is futile and impossible. Thus far, so good, although
modem social science belies this line of justification. But his theory also
commits us to the view that government does not have to tolerate the
religious actions or practices of others, even if they are tolerant. As long
as our reasons for regulating these actions are "in the interest of the
commonwealth," which government solely determines, the religious nature
of the actions regulated does not matter and the effects of government
action on those practices do not matter at all!
Locke's answer is incomplete and probably inconsistent. It is
incomplete because it regulates tolerant and intolerant actions
indiscriminately without demonstrating why we should not distinguish
between the two. More importantly, it is arguably inconsistent because it
regulates tolerant actions without demonstrating how such regulation is
38 See supra notes 11 -12 and accompanying text.
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required by our commitment to liberalism. Arguably, just the opposite is
required by our liberalism: we should tolerate, not regulate, tolerant
religious acts.
II. JOHN STUART MILL: ON LIBERTY
Nearly two hundred years after Locke wrote his famous letter, there
was a movement afoot in England to prohibit the sale and consumption of
alcohol. John Stuart Mill quoted the spokesman of the movement, Lord
Stanley, as follows: "All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience,
appear to me to be without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social
act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the State
itself, and not in the individual, to be within it." 39 Note the similarity to
Locke's dualism in Lord Stanley's argument. Government can regulate all
outward conduct because it is inherently social and within the sphere of
legislation, while anything pertaining to individual agency is to be located
within the inward sphere of personal thought. The concepts of liberalism
and tolerance in mid-nineteenth century England had not changed
significantly in nearly two hundred years.
Mill, however, was deeply troubled by Lord Stanley's argument and
claimed that "there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify. ' '4°
Mill attacked the argument's unsupported dualism-unfettered inward
thought versus government-controlled outward conduct-because it
excluded "a third class, different from either of these, viz., acts and habits
which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that
the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. 4 1 The point of Mill's
criticism is clear-not all outward conduct is "social" and thereby subject
to discretionary government control. There is a sphere of outward
"individual" conduct where government regulation cannot be justified. To
hold otherwise is to countenance a theory of governmental power where
any violation of individual liberty can be justified. Mill then sets out to
devise a principle of government regulation that will safeguard the sphere
of outward "individual" conduct.
A. The Harm Principle . What Does Not Constitute "Harm"
Mill stated his principle, the now-famous "harm principle," as
follows:
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That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil
in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is
desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one
else.
42
Although Mill sometimes used imprecise language in describing
outward "individual" conduct, 43 we must not assume that the harm
principle rests on another untenable dualism-this time, a dualism in the
realm of action, between actions that only affect the agent, and actions that
affect others.44 Several commentators accused Mill of this error and
proceeded to argue that there are no actions solely affecting the agent,
because all actions, in principle at least, have an effect on others. Robert
Paul Wolff, for example, pointed out that a devout Calvinist or vegetarian
might be "harmed" because the "very presence in his community of a
Catholic or a meat-eater may cause him fully as much pain as a blow to the
face or the theft of his purse. 45 Because all outward conduct potentially
affects others, these critics contended that the harm principle potentially
subjects all outward conduct to government regulation.
In fact, Mill is not guilty of bifurcating outward conduct by its effects.
He properly acknowledged that even "individual," self-regarding conduct
potentially affects others.46 The harm principle is proffered as a principle
42 Id. at 271.
41 Id. at 305 ("The distinction here pointed out [is] between the part of a person's life which
concerns only himself, and that which concerns others.").
I do not mean to imply, of course, that Mill was only interested in protecting conduct and
not protecting thought or belief. See On Liberty, supra note 15, at 274; see also infra notes 60, 80
and accompanying text.
45 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 24 (Boston Univ. Press 1969).
46 For example, Mill wrote:
How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter
of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is
impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself,
without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them.
On Liberty, supra note 15, at 305. "When I say [affects] only himself, I mean directly, and in the
first instance; for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself" Id. at 272.
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of political justification, not as a metaphysical principle. The harm
principle requires that some of the effects of our actions on others should
not count as justification for the political regulation of those acts; it does
not require that an individual's conduct have no affect on others in order to
be protected. Specifically, the harm principle excludes as a method of
political justification the moral distress that others have with our actions-
what Mill terms the effects of our actions on others that result from their
"notions of morality, taste, or propriety. 4 7 This type of effect on others
does not constitute "harm" under Mill's principle. Excluding morality,
taste, and propriety as methods of political justification has significant
consequences for Mill because "[tihe likings and dislikings of society, or
of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has
practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under
the penalties of law or opinion.
' ' 8
For Mill, the sphere of outward "individual" conduct safeguarded by
the harm principle includes: (1) those actions that primarily affect the
agent alone (if there are such acts), and (2) acts that affect "other people
solely insofar as they believe such actions to be right or wrong. 4 9 As to
both types of effects, there is no harm to others under the harm principle
and individual independence from government regulation is, as of right,
absolute. Joseph Raz succinctly stated this point: "The common way of
stating [the harm principle's] point is to regard it as excluding
considerations of private morality from politics. ' 50 In other words, Mill
did not deny that the presence of Catholics in the community might
distress the devout Calvinist. Instead, he denied that such distress is a
harm warranting government intervention or regulation. Precluding the
moral distress of others as a method of political justification explains
Mill's statement to the effect that the opinions of others concerning the
wisdom or foolishness of an act does not constitute harm, and cannot,
without more, justify government regulation of the act.5' In order to justify
the political regulation of outward "individual" conduct, a different kind of
harm to others is required.
41 Id. at 270.
48 Id.
49 C. L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 19 (1980) (quoting Richard Wollheim, John Stuart Mill
and the Limits of State Action, 40 SOC. RES. 9 (1973)).
50 JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 413 (1986); see also WALDRON, supra note
2, at 115-33.
51 See text quoted supra note 42. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (stating
that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice") (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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B. The Harm Principle H: What Does Constitute "Harm"
An idea of the kinds of outward conduct that do cause harm to others
can be gleaned from the examples that Mill lists in On Liberty. First,
physical harm to others constitutes harm under Mill's principle.52 So the
blow to the face of the devout Calvinist does constitute harm. In
discussing the prevention of violent crime, Mill wrote that "definite
damage, or a definite risk of damage" to another individual provides prima
facie justification for government to regulate the action.53 So the theft of
the devout Calvinist's purse also constitutes harm. Additionally, the
violation of "a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or
persons" also constitutes a prima facie justification for government
regulation. 54 Mill explained that "[n]o person ought to be punished simply
for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being
drunk on duty.",55 Harm also includes a public dimension requiring "each
person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the
labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members
from injury and molestation. 5 6 Finally, the foreseeable risks of the above
harms afford government the power to prevent crime and accidents before
they occur, but there must be evidence close to "certainty," not "only a
danger of mischief," for government regulation of pre-harmful acts to be
justified.57
Two points in Mill's discussion of the kinds of acts that cause harm to
others are of particular importance. First, the class of actions that
constitute "harm to others" is fairly circumscribed. Mill's discussion of
these harmful acts essentially required that government not interfere with
the physical agency of others.58 Second, and more important, Mill's
discussion presumed that outward "individual" conduct should not be
interfered with unless it can be established that the conduct causes harm to
52 See On Liberty, supra note 15, at 303 (citing "molestation" as harm to others).
" Id. at 306, 313 (discussing the prevention of crime and accidents).
4 Id. at 306.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 303.
51 Id. at313.
58 Isaiah Berlin correctly claimed that Mill's notion of liberty is aligned with a "negative"
notion of liberty. See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7 (1958) (explaining the
"negative" notion of liberty as follows: "I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no
human being interferes with my activity"). In fairness to Mill, he did recognize some "positive"
liberties (duties) as well as the liberty of noninterference, but noted that "[t]o make any one
answerable for doing evil to others is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil is,
comparatively speaking, the exception." On Liberty, supra note 15, at 272.
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another, and only harm of a specific circumscribed sort will count.59
Mill's presumption in favor of allowing individuals to act out their life
projects, life plans, and social associations, unless there is established
evidence of a particular kind of harm to others, is the vital component of
individual agency missing from Locke's theory.
Mill wrote that the safeguarded region of outward "individual"
conduct includes: (1) "the inward domain of consciousness; ' 60 (2) "liberty
of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character;, 6 1 and (3) "liberty... of combination among individuals., 62
Implementing Mill's harm principle, thus, reunited the components of
individual agency that were separated by Locke-the freedom to make
choices and the presumptive freedom to act out, and on, those choices.
63
Because Mill's principle achieves this deeper unity of individual agency,
presumptively protecting both individual thought and outward lifestyle, I
term Mill's principle a "thicker" answer to liberal tolerance than that
afforded by Locke's thin dualism.
C. Autonomy and the Diversity ofLifestyles
Implementing Mill's brand of liberalism requires a community to
redefine its notion of tolerance to include the right of individuals to act out,
and on, their interests as well as to exclude the moral distress of its
members as grounds for political regulation. These are serious political
commitments for any community to make.
Mill's underlying justification for such serious commitments is
centered on a fundamental commitment to individual autonomy. For Mill,
individual autonomy-the self-authorship of our lives-is an intrinsic
good. Constructing our lives for ourselves is as intrinsically important to
us as the types of lives we construct.64 Mill wrote that "[i]f a person
59 Indeed, in situations where the competing interests of individuals are opposed, such as
competition for trade, political, or professional positions, Mill claimed that the inevitable harm to
some competitor does not justify government regulation. Mill wrote, "it must by no means be
supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify
the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference." On Liberty,
supra note 15, at 312.
60 Id. at 272.
61 Id. at 273.
62 Id.
63 See supra part I.C.
64 To be sure, Mill does recognize that some lifestyles are better than others, and he does
not ignore the value of achieving a greater consensus concerning the better lifestyles. But if this
consensus is achieved by imposition, rather than through autonomous choice, he states that it
would be "no trifling drawback" from the potential benefit that might be achieved from the
universal recognition of the "best" lifestyles. On Liberty, supra note 15, at 287-88.
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possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own
mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in
itself, but because it is his own mode., 6 5 Individual autonomy is also an
essential ingredient of human happiness, regardless if it is used to achieve
bad ends or to make bad choices.66 He stated, "Where, not the person's
own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of
conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human
happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social
progress."67
If individual autonomy is intrinsically valuable, then Mill argued that
the political procurement of the conditions necessary for autonomous
lifestyles is also intrinsically valuable. According to Mill, individual
autonomy requires two necessary conditions: "freedom[] and variety of
situations.,' 68 The condition of freedom required for individual autonomy
is best achieved by government implementation of the harm principle; our
choices and actions have enough room for exercise if the government does
not interfere with our activities until we harm others. The condition of
variety required for individual autonomy is best achieved by exposure to a
wide range of beliefs, issues, and lifestyles; this exposure, in turn, is best
assured by excluding the moral distress of others as a method of political
regulation. On this last point, Jeremy Waldron wrote:
On Liberty contains several arguments in favor of individual freedom of
thought, discussion, and life-style. The most important of these are based
on the desirability of what I am going to refer to as ethical
confrontation-the open clash between earnestly held ideals and opinions
about the nature and basis of the good life. Ethical confrontation should
be understood to include conflicts on all sorts of issues-moral,
philosophical, political, and religious-and to range from verbal debate
on the one hand to the demonstration and flaunting of rival life-styles on
the other. On Mill's view, the main argument against interference with
individual liberty was that it diminished the occasion and opportunity for
ethical confrontation in this sense.
69
Mill stated that "[t]he beliefs which we have most warrant for have no
safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove
65 Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
66 See id. at 283 ("Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and
preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because
they do not suffer themselves to think."); cf RAZ, supra note 50, at 411-12 (explaining that an
autonomy-based freedom does not extend to the morally bad or repugnant, but admitting the
value of autonomy even in choosing the morally bad or repugnant).
67 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 293-94.6 Id. at 294.
69 WALDRON, supra note 2, at 120-21 (emphasis in original).
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them unfounded., 70  If we do not experience the confrontation with
conflicting viewpoints and lifestyles, then our personal creeds and life
choices lose their meaning; they become "a few phrases retained by
rote, 71 and "remain[] as it were outside the mind.., manifesting [their]
power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but
[themselves] doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel
over them to keep them vacant."72  In this situation, we are not living
autonomous lives, and our choices are little more than "dead dogma."
73
Indeed, the confrontation with diverse opinions and lifestyles is so
important to living autonomously that if they are not readily available in
our society, Mill insisted that we should have to manufacture them.
74
Modem discussions of individual autonomy propose similar structural
conditions. For example, Joseph Raz stated that "[t]he conditions of
autonomy are complex and consist of three distinct components:
appropriate mental abilities, an adequate range of options, and
independence.,75 Mill also stated that individual autonomy can only be
achieved with the possession of a "tolerable amount of common sense and
experience., 76  Individuals must have the appropriate mental abilities to
live autonomously; as such, Mill did not apply the harm principle's
presumption to children or to those who cannot take care of themselves.77
Perhaps more than any other writer, Mill emphasized the central
importance of confronting a range of options in order to live
70 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 277; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377
(1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring) (stating "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones" and that "[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(writing that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out"). It should be noted that Mill extended his argument for the freedom of opinion,
as do I, to include the autonomy of lifestyles. Mill stated "the reasons which make it imperative
that human beings should be free to form opinions.., the same reasons... require that men
should be free to act upon their opinions-to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance,
either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril." On
Liberty, supra note 15, at 293.
71 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 285.
72 Id. at 286.
71 See id. at 283.
74 See id. at 284, 288. To drive home his point, Mill noted that even "[t]he most intolerant
of churches, the Roman Catholic Church ... at the canonisation of a saint, admits, and listens
patiently to, a 'devil's advocate.' The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to
posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed." Id. at
276-77.
75 RAZ, supra note 50, at 372.
76 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 299.
77 See id. at 271-72.
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autonomously. He wrote, "[a] man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to
fit him unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole
warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than
with a coat?, 78  Finally, the necessary condition of independence
mentioned by Raz is supplied in Mill's theory by implementing the harm
principle to limit external control over individual choice and action.79
We now see that Mill did offer an underlying justification for the
difficult political move towards implementing the harm principle. In short,
communities holding themselves out as "liberal" communities, such as our
community, are structured on an underlying fundamental commitment to
individual autonomy. It is the move to the harm principle--extending our
notion of tolerance to include the right of individuals to act out, and on,
their interests and excluding the moral distress of citizens as grounds for
political regulation-that will best achieve the conditions necessary for
individual autonomy to flourish.
D. Mill's Answer: "Thick Pluralism "--Tolerate Religious Belief and
Practice, Unless There is Harm
The foregoing analysis provides us with Mill's answer to our original
question concerning how much tolerance should be extended to religious
lifestyles. Mill's brand of liberalism, similar to Locke's, commits us to
tolerating both tolerant and intolerant religious beliefs. 80 Instead of basing
this protection on a flawed epistemology, however, Mill based the
protection on an underlying theory of individual autonomy. The reason to
prevent government regulation of religious belief is the value we place on
autonomy, the self-authorship of our lives. If government can censor our
beliefs with impunity, our autonomy would all but vanish. Significantly,
the moral distress of others, or of the government, cannot justify the
regulation of religious belief. Mill did not claim that such regulation is
impossible or futile. His essay is replete with examples of such
" Id. at 299.
79 See supra Part ILA, II.B.
80 Mill's famous example of the corn-dealer delineates the extent of his theory's protection
for opinion and belief Mill wrote:
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a
placard.
On Liberty, supra note 15, at 293; cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
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regulation. 81 Rather, he claimed that such regulation is not consistent with
our commitment to liberalism and autonomy, as understood through the
harm principle.
Unlike Locke's theory, however, Mill's brand of liberalism does
supply us with a principled way to distinguish tolerant from intolerant
actions. Actions that harm others are intolerant actions, and only they are
subject to government regulation. The practices of religious adherents that
do not harm others, in either their physical integrity or assignable
obligations, should not be subject to government control. As with all
individual agents, Mill armed religious adherents with a prima facie
presumption against regulating their beliefs and activities where there is no
established harm to others. The moral distress of others, or of the
government, cannot serve as justification for the regulation of religious
practice. Even the illiberal "flaunting" of rival religious lifestyles should
be permitted.s2 Mill wrote:
[I]t is fit to take some notice of those who say that the free expression of
all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be
temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be
said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be
placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinions are attacked, I
think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is
telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and
whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any
strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent.8 3
For an example of the scope of tolerance extended by Mill to
allegedly illiberal religious lifestyles, we need look no further than his
discussion of Mormonism and the practice of polygamy nearly twenty
years before the Supreme Court would sanction the legal prohibition of the
practice. 4 Mill argued that the general moral disapprobation of the
practice, which the Supreme Court relies on to ban polygamy,85 does not
justify government intervention. 86 Because by all accounts, such activity is
"voluntary on the part of the women," our moral notions against such
behavior do not count as harm and do not, without more, provide us with
8l See generally On Liberty, supra note 15, at 302-12 (recounting the long history of
religious repression and persecution of different sects).
82 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
83 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 292.
m See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878).
85 Id. at 164 ("Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of
the life of Asiatic and of African people.").
86 On Liberty, supra note 15, at 311.
[Vol.43:367
2004] TAKING LIBERALISM AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY SERIOUSLY 38
justifiable grounds for the political regulation of the practice.87 In short,
the alleged intolerance of a religious lifestyle, both in belief and practice-
Mill's term is the "intemperance" of the lifestyle 8 -- does not strip that
lifestyle of its protection under the harm principle unless it can be
established that the pursuit of this chosen lifestyle harms others.
Finally, whereas Locke's theory of toleration does not even entertain
the effect of government regulation on religious practice, Mill's theory
provides a principled way to distinguish between justified and unjustified
government regulation. Only those regulations that prevent imminent
harm to others are justified in regulating religious practices. Indeed, the
structural importance of the diversity of lifestyles under Mill's theory of
individual autonomy arguably requires government to take positive steps to
maintain the diversity of religious practices, specifically the practices of
minority religions. 89 Mill wrote:
[I]f either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not
merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the
one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority
[because it] is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the
neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of
obtaining less than its share.
90
Based on the foregoing discussion, if we take our commitment to
liberalism seriously, and I contend that we must, we see that Mill's notion
of religious tolerance more adequately expresses that commitment than
does Locke's. As I have termed Locke's notion of religious tolerance
"thin dualism," I now term Mill's notion of religious tolerance "thick
pluralism." Mill's notion of religious tolerance is based on an underlying
commitment to individual autonomy-reuniting the freedom to make
choices with the presumptive freedom to act out, and on, those choices-
and it requires that we maintain the widest diversity of lifestyles, including
religious lifestyles, in order for individual autonomy to flourish.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 292.
89 See TEN, supra note 49, 60-61 (explaining that "there is no necessary connection
between Millian liberalism and either a doctrine of economic laissez-faire, or a theory of the
minimal functions of the state. It is possible to combine Mill's liberty principle with, for
examle, a belief in socialism.").
On Liberty, supra note 15, at 289.
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III. CURRENT RELIGION CLAUSES JURISPRUDENCE: SHIFTING OUR NOTION
OF TOLERATION FROM LOCKE TO MILL
I have claimed that our current national commitment to religious
liberty is to a thin conception of religious liberty that protects essentially
religious belief, not practice-a conception of religious liberty we inherit
primarily from John Locke. I do not mean to imply that the Supreme
Court's current interpretations of the Religion Clauses are driven by the
same concerns that drove Locke, or by his particular epistemological
commitments or values. Several commentators have suggested, quite
plausibly I think, that the current Court is motivated not so much by a
concern for religious liberty as by its new emphasis on the ascendant value
of equality--equal treatment between religion and non-religion-that
influences so heavily most areas of constitutional analysis today.9'
Nevertheless, it is not mere coincidence that a thin theory of religious
liberty is an easier fit with the Court's new commitment to equality than is
a thick theory. To see that this is the case, we need only to step back and
look at what is required by a commitment to equality. A commitment to
equal treatment is not concerned with the amount of liberty to be afforded
individuals; rather, it is concerned with the conditions under which it is
afforded. A commitment to equal treatment can be satisfied by both a
government regulation that affords individuals robust protection for their
right-claims and by a regulation that affords the same individuals no
protection at all. As long as everybody gets the same amount, the actual
amount of liberty afforded does not raise an equality concern. 92 If the
91 See, e.g., DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 207
(2003) ("The trend toward formal equality brings increasing coherence to the Supreme Court's
constitutional decisionmaking under the Religion Clauses."); John H. Garvey, Freedom and
Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 209 n.68 (noting that although the
Court has not always adopted the "equality" principle in its Establishment Clause cases "the state
of the law might be considerably improved if it were"). Philip B. Kurland noted:
These commands [of the Religion Clauses] would be impossible of effectuation unless
they are read together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal
protection clause than to the due process clause, i.e., they must be read to mean that
religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental
action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of
duties or obligations.
Philip B. Kurland, Of Church andState andthe Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961);
see also Mark Tushnet, "'Of Church and State and the Supreme Court ": Kurland Revisited, 1989
SUP. CT. REV. 373, 400-02 (arguing for the adoption of Kurland's analysis). But see Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 877 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality's "equality"
position stating that "[t]here is no rule of religious equal protection to the effect that any
expenditure for the benefit of religious school students is necessarily constitutional so long as
public school pupils are favored on ostensibly identical terms.").
92 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (holding that there is no
equal protection violation when a municipality chooses to close all access to public swimming
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demands of equality are met in both situations, it is easy to discern that
practical constraints will shift the Court toward a thin theory of protection.
Practically speaking, protection can most easily be distributed to all (equal
treatment) if the amount of protection is fairly small. A thick theory of
religious liberty, on the other hand, is concerned with the actual amount of
liberty afforded individuals, and falling below a certain amount is
unjustified even if everyone falls (equally) below the required amount. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the Court's current Religion Clauses
jurisprudence combines Locke's notion of thin religious toleration with its
new commitment to equal treatment. Unfortunately, the problems
attending this thin notion of toleration are also present in modem case law.
I hope to demonstrate that one possible way to avoid these attendant
problems is to shift our notion of religious tolerance from Locke's thin
dualism to Mill's thick pluralism.
A. Free Exercise
For more than a decade the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause has focused primarily on the reasons or motivations for
government regulation of religious practice-not on the effects of such
regulation.93  If government regulates religious practice because it is
religious, meaning that government proffers a religious (or an anti-
religious) rationale for the regulation, then the regulation is constitutionally
impermissible.94 For example, if government regulates peyote use only
because it is used as part of the sacrament of the Native American Church,
then the regulation's improper (anti-religious) motive violates the Free
Exercise Clause. If, on the other hand, government can present secular
reasons for the regulation that are generally applicable to religious and
non-religious practices alike, even if the resulting regulation severely
affects religious practice, then "the First Amendment has not been
offended." 95  So the general even-handed regulation of controlled
substances, which includes banning the use of peyote by Native American
pools, rather than integrate them, because the effect of the regulation treats everyone the same-
no one receives the benefit of the pools).
93 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Before the Court were the claims
of Alfred Smith and Galen Black, who were fired from their jobs with a private drug
rehabilitation organization, because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony
of the Native American Church. Id. at 874. Their subsequent application for unemployment
benefits was denied because the state of Oregon determined that petitioners were fired for work-
related "misconduct." Id. After a series of determinations by various courts, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits violated petitioners' free exercise rights
under the First Amendment. Id. at 874-76. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 890.
94 See id. at 877.
9' Id. at 878.
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Church members, does not offend the Free Exercise Clause if motivated by
government's general concern with rising drug use nationwide. There will
be no violation of free exercise, therefore, if the regulation burdens
religious practice for secular, non-religious reasons.
This recent re-interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause significantly
altered the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause in earlier case
law.96  Prior case law held that once the claimant demonstrated that
government regulation significantly burdened her religious practice, the
burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the regulation met a
"compelling" interest and used the least restrictive means to attain that
interest. 97 We need to take a closer look at the argument presented by the
Court requiring such a drastic change in the protections afforded to
religious practices by the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court began its new interpretation of free exercise with a now
familiar claim: "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. 98
This basic immunity of religious belief from government regulation
existed in both Locke and Mill's notion of religious toleration, 99 and the
Court followed their lead by stating that free exercise excludes
"governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such."' 00
Of course, the free exercise of religion involves more than mere belief
and profession. It also includes the acts of religious adherents, for
example, assembling with others for worship, participating in sacraments,
and proselytizing, to name a few. The Court stated that government
regulation seeking to regulate such acts "only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display"
is constitutionally prohibited.10  In effect, such government regulation
would itself be based on (anti-) religious reasons, by its denial of the
legitimacy of the religious reasons of others, and improperly run afoul of
96 As we shall see, it also harkens back to a conception of religious toleration first
announced by the Court in 1878. See id. at 879 ("Laws ... are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices.") (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)). See also infra
pages 392-93.
97 See, e.g., Frazee v. 11. Dep't. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd, 450 U.S.
707, 718-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398,406-09 (1963).
98 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
" See supra Parts IA, II.D (explaining Locke's and Mill's notion of religious toleration
respectively).
'O Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402).
101 Id.
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both free exercise and establishment restrictions. It should be recalled that
this step in the Court's analysis is similar to Locke's proviso that
government regulation of the realm of social interaction cannot be based
on religious reasons. The government cannot mandate, or prohibit, "any
rites and ceremonies in any Church."' 0 2  And according to Mill, such
government regulation of religious practice would be improper unless it
could be demonstrated that the practice in question harms the interests of
others.10 3  Thus far, the Court's reasoning is consistent with its prior
precedent and also consistent with either Locke or Mill's notion of
religious toleration.
It is the next step in the Court's analysis that is so troubling: the
Court claimed that if regulating the exercise of religion is not the object of
government regulation, but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable provision, then no free exercise interest is infringed. The Court
stated that "[i]t is a permissible reading of the text ... to say that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [regulation]
but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."' 0 4  The
Court's understanding of religious liberty does not "reliev[e] the individual
from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction
of religious beliefs."'0 5 In other words, if the government has a secular
reason for the regulation, religious adherents must obey the regulation
even if it effectively curtails the religious practice in question. The Court
stated that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).' ,,106
This line of the Court's argument mirrors Locke's dualism and his
analysis of animal sacrifice. 10 7 If the government's regulation is based on
religious grounds, the government cannot mandate that a particular religion
either partake of or discontinue animal sacrifice. But, the government may
curtail the slaughter of animals, including religiously mandated animal
sacrifice, if it can present a secular reason for the regulation. In the case
before the Court, peyote was regulated as a controlled criminal substance
102 FIRST LETrER, supra note 4, at 39. See discussion supra Part I.C.
103 See discussion supra Part IID.
104 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
105 Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940)).
106 Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)).
107 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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under a general criminal statute. 10 8  To borrow from Locke's famous
passage: The law in this case was "not made about a religious, but a
political matter," nor was the sacrament of the Native American Church,
but the criminal possession of a controlled substance, thereby prohibited.10 9
Of course, religious adherents, who are denied unemployment benefits
because they practice their religion,110 will find little solace or comfort in
the government's secular justification for such a burden. To use Locke's
phrase, the regulation's justification lies in "the interest of the
commonwealth."' 11
It is not by accident that at this stage of the argument the Court found
support for its position in an old case concerning criminalization of the
practice of polygamy. The Smith Court cited to the Reynolds Court for the
proposition that to allow religious adherents a presumption in favor of their
right to free exercise when secular government regulation invades that
right is "in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
112
The Reynolds Court allowed the regulation of a fundamental practice of
Mormonism by reasoning that "Congress was deprived of all legislative
power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."" 3  A clearer
affirmation of Locke's dualism is hard to find: religious belief is
protected; religious practice is unprotected. The current Court, one
hundred and twenty-five years later, still seems satisfied with this
separation of religious belief from religious conduct.
Similar to our analysis of Locke's notion of religious tolerance in Part
I, the adequacy of the Court's interpretation of free exercise depends upon
the importance of religious practice to our conception of religious liberty.
The Court's interpretation implies that the importance of individual agency
lies only in the act(s) of choosing our religious beliefs, but not in the
practices that result from those choices (beliefs). So long as government
regulation is not specifically directed at regulating religious practice
because it is religious, regulation may effectively curtail religious practice
if it is rooted in independent secular reasons. In the modern regulatory
state, few, if any, laws are directed specifically at religious practices
because they are religious.1 14  Most laws are generally applicable to
"08 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
109 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
"1o See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
1 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
112 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
113 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
114 Of course, even today a regulation can be directed at a religious practice because it is
religious, even if modem legislatures are clever enough not to identify the religious practice in
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religious and non-religious practices alike and, therefore, they only
incidentally affect the practices regulated. Justice O'Connor correctly
noted, however, that a "person is barred from freely exercising his religion
regardless of whether the law prohibits the conduct only when engaged in
for religious reasons, only by members of that religion, or by all
persons ... even if the law is generally applicable."" 
5
For the Court, the effects of government regulation on religious
practice are of no concern if the reasons for the regulation are secular.
Similar to Locke's analysis, the Court's theory is that we do not have to
tolerate the objections of religious adherents if their objections are based
on the effects of government regulation on their religious practices.1
6
Such complaints, if they are to succeed, must be based on the improper
(religious) reasons for the regulation, and it will be government that
determines if its motivations are religious or not. Moreover, generally
applicable regulations are, by implication, properly secular and
constitutionally valid.
It is at this stage of the Court's argument-the justification of
government regulation if it is generally applicable to all-that Mill's
notion of religious toleration becomes incompatible with the Court's
analysis and, as we have seen, with Locke. For Mill, the scope of a law
does not justify enacting it; a regulation is justified only if it prevents harm
to others. Unless the government can demonstrate harm to others, the
importance we place on individual agency and autonomy requires a prima
facie presumption in favor of not regulating the activity in question. In the
case before the Court, the central question should have been what harm
were petitioners causing to others by their sacramental use of peyote, either
to the physical integrity of others or in petitioners' assignable obligations
to others? Arguably, there was no harm to others, 1 7 and as long as there
is no evidence of harm to others, the prima facie presumption in favor of
allowing the religious practice to continue remains in force.
Instead of recognizing this presumption in favor of individual agency,
the Court called such a presumption a "luxury." The Court stated that "we
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to
the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an
the statutory language. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533-40 (1993) (holding municipal regulation specifically directed at Santerian religious practice
invalid because it allowed the slaughter of animals for (almost) any reason except the Santerian
sacrifice of animals).
"5 Smith, 494 U.S. at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116 See discussion supra page 376-77.
... See Smith, 494 U.S. at 911-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (pointing that there was no
finding of harm in the case).
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interest of the highest order."'1 18 The Court, as did Locke, interpreted the
presumption of control exactly backwards. If providing individual agency
with a prima facie presumption against government regulation-unless the
regulation is of the highest order-is a luxury, then our fundamental
commitment to liberalism is also a luxury. A consistent theory of
liberalism would have government regulation accountable, in principle at
least, to individual agency and not the other way around.
The Court's argument provokes the following question: If we do
deem government regulation of religious conduct presumptively invalid,
do we also necessarily run the risk, which so concerned the Court in Smith,
of permitting each religious adherent "to become a law unto himself'?" 9
The answer must be "No." Our commitment to individual agency and
autonomy establishes only a prima facie protection for individual choice
and lifestyle-not an absolute protection. Of course, this presumption of
allowing individuals to act out their beliefs has limits. The presumptive
protection is defeasible if harm to others can be established. Mill's
position is that where harm to others is established, a primafacie case for
government regulation is established. For example, cases denying the free
exercise claims of religious adherents to refuse blood transfusions for their
children are decided correctly because of the harm to others (the children)
which such practices foreseeably cause.120 In cases where there is no
established harm to others, however, the government must present a very
significant interest that defeats the prima facie presumption against such
regulation. What Mill had in mind in these cases, I contend, more closely
approximates the "compelling" interest test, as enunciated in the Court's
prior free exercise jurisprudence, 121 than the thin protection afforded
religious liberty in Smith. 122 At least the test enunciated in the prior case
118 Id. at 888.
119 Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
120 See, e.g., In re President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618 (1952) (holding that a child whose parents refused
a life-saving blood transfusion was considered a neglected child and authorizing a guardian to
consent to the procedure); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (determining
that a child whose father refuses a blood transfusion because of religious reasons is held to be a
ward of the state); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.1947) (affirming that the
child was a neglected child and that a blood transfusion was necessary even if parents did not
consent). See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (holding that
"[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the
child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death" and that a parent does not have
the right to put her child in harm's way because of her religious beliefs) (citations omitted).
121 See cases cited supra note 97 and accompanying text.
122 The Court did recognize how important the "compelling" interest test is to other fields of
law, namely, in free speech and equal protection. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86. But in those
fields the Court's current test does not extend to "race-neutral laws that have the effect of
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law gets the fundamental presumption of liberalism-protecting individual
agency--correct. Mill's answer to the Court's concern in Smith is that
each person is not a law unto himself if his actions are constrained by the
prevention of harm to others, and by the like liberty for all.
The final stage in the Court's reasoning in Smith is perhaps the most
troubling of all. If courts will no longer protect religious practices from
government interference as long as regulations are based on secular and
generally applicable provisions, then the only recourse religious adherents
have for the toleration of their lifestyles rests with the political branches.
The Court wrote, "Values that are protected against government
interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
banished from the political process" 123 and concluded with the following
admission:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a sy3tem in which each conscience is a
law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 121
The passage is embarrassing, because even the Court recognized that
majority religions, with enough political clout, will ensure that their
religious practices are not significantly infringed by incidental legislation.
For example, legislation prohibiting the use of alcohol because of its
deleterious health effects, which would include banning its use in religious
sacraments, would now pass constitutional muster under the theory of free
exercise enunciated in Smith. In practice, however, if legislators wish to
be reelected, the political clout of the Catholic Church would prevent such
a regulation's enactment. Minority religions, without numbers sufficient
to affect the political process, will remain the hapless victims of incidental
legislation regulating their religious practices. Neither constitutional text
nor even the Court's recent commitment to equal treatment in this area of
jurisprudence supports such unequal treatment of minority religious
liberties.
Instead of relegating minority religions to second-class citizenship,
which is alleged to be the unavoidable consequence of democratic
disproportionately disadvantaging" a particular racial group or to "generally applicable laws
unconcerned with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech." Id. at 886
n.3. This analysis reinforces just how thin a notion of religious tolerance, proposed in the
majority's opinion, is. The effects of government regulation on religious practice are not
considered pertinent; and if they are considered at all, it "is a constitutional anomaly." Id. at 886.
123 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
124 Id.
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government, 125 Mill's theory requires government not only to be mindful
of the effects of its actions on religious practice, but requires heightened
scrutiny of government regulation affecting minority religious practice.
According to Mill, it is minority religious practice that has the better claim
to our tolerance because it is more vulnerable and exposed more easily to
extinction. 126 The slow loss of divergent, minority lifestyles through
incidental government regulation coerces those living the lifestyles in
question and also slowly undermines the conditions necessary for the
autonomy of us all.
This discussion has demonstrated that a shift to Mill's theory of
religious tolerance has practical doctrinal consequences. If we shift our
notion of religious tolerance from Locke to Mill, and every argument in
the preceding discussion indicates that we should, then we must shift
correspondingly the Court's doctrinal test for free exercise from Smith
back to Sherbert.'
27
125 However, note Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith quoting Justice Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)).
126 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The Court's latest foray into free exercise did
not result in greater protection for the petitioner who lost his free exercise claim, but it may have
signaled that Court is no longer willing to use the formal neutrality doctrine enunciated in Smith
to the exclusion of a burden balancing test when addressing a free exercise claim-a test which
would look at the effects of government regulation on religious practice again. See Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). The majority noted that "the State's disfavor of
religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind ... impos[ing] neither criminal nor civil
sanctions on any type of religious service or rite." Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312. The majority went
on to state that "[t]he State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is
substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise
Scholars." Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1315. The Warren Court using the Sherbert test could not have
said it better. The majority's justification of government regulation sounds like a return to a type
of burden analysis, and it did not elude the critical eye of Justice Scalia, who wrote the Smith
majority. Scalia stated:
The Court offers no authority for approving facial discrimination against religion
simply because its material consequences are not severe. I might understand such a
test if we were still in the business of reviewing facially neutral laws that merely
happen to burden some individual's religious exercise, but we are not.
Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 885). If the Court is
signaling such a shift, it would be welcomed.
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B. Establishment
The Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence has undergone
almost as radical a transformation as the recent transformation in its free
exercise jurisprudence described above. The Court's early Establishment
Clause jurisprudence expansively read the clause to prohibit three main
types of government regulation: (1) government regulations based on
sectarian reasons or motivations; 128 (2) regulations that required undue
interference or "entanglement" between secular and sectarian
institutions; 129 and, (3) government regulations the effects of which
primarily advance religion.' 30 The problems with this expansive reading of
the restrictions of the Establishment Clause are legion, if not somewhat
128 See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (holding that "to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be secular legislative purpose").
The Court prohibited sectarian rationales from government regulation based on the view that the
Establishment Clause "was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support for religion." Id. at 217. Locke could not have said it any better. See supra notes 29-31
and accompanying text. Of course, this restriction would become known as the "secular purpose"
prong of the Lemon test, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), and because the
Court viewed each prong of the Lemon test as an independent safeguard of disestablishment, the
Court would use the lack of secular purpose to strike down legislation without even considering
the legislation's effects or possible entanglements. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
585 (1987) (finding sufficient grounds, in the absence of clear secular purpose, to strike down a
Louisiana statute which mandated that "creationist science" instruction needed to accompany any
teaching of evolution theory in public schools); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09
(1968) (deeming unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that prohibited the teaching of the theory
of evolution in public schools on the grounds that the statute's purpose was the advancement of
fundamentalist sectarian views).
129 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (allowing tax exemptions for
religious organizations based partly on the fact that "the end result-the effect-is not an
excessive government entanglement with religion ... [and that] [e]limination of exemption
would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church
property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the
train of those legal processes"). Again, this restriction would become known as the "excessive
entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. It would also serve
independently to safeguard disestablishment. See, e.g., id. at 613-14 (striking down the
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs supplying partial government dollars for parochial
school teachers solely because "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion").
130 See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 ("The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution."); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (stating the "primary effects" prong of its test as
requiring that the regulation's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"). I couch this restriction as restricting "advancement" of religion only, not the
"inhibition" of religion, because I know of no case where a regulation's inhibition of religion has
required the Court to declare it unconstitutional.
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comical.13  By enforcing each of the restrictions independently, the
Court's early expansion of disestablishment effectively placed
governmental regulation in an untenable position. On the one hand, if
government attempted to assure that its regulation would not advance
religion, then the regulation was subject to violating the non-interference
or "entanglement" restriction. On the other hand, if government did not
monitor the potential advancement of religion, then the regulation was
subject to violating the restriction against non-advancement. Even the
Court was aware of this "Catch-22" in applying the Lemon test. 32
More important for our purposes, this expansive reading of the
Establishment Clause also generated the unnecessary conflict between the
demands of disestablishment and the demands of free exercise. During
this same period, as we have seen, the Court also read the Free Exercise
Clause as requiring government to exempt religious practice from
burdensome regulation unless it could present a "compelling" interest for
the regulation. 133  Candidly, such free exercise exemptions required
government to have a "sectarian" purpose as well as to "advance" religion.
Free exercise exemptions thus violated the Court's then-concurrent
disestablishment jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor correctly wrote that "[i]t
is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when the manifest
objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a
government-imposed burden."' 34  As we have seen, such free exercise
exemptions are required by a shift to a more robust theory of religious
toleration.' 35  Something must give. Accordingly, the Court's early
disestablishment understanding of "secular" purpose and "advancement"
of religion must be modified to allow such exemptions without violating
establishment concerns. As is, the Court's early expansive reading of
131 For example, under the restrictions of the Lemon test government may pay for parochial
students' bus fare to and from school. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1947).
Yet it cannot pay for parochial school trips. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254-55
(1977). Government may fund the costs of books for parochial school students. See Bd. of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968). Yet it cannot cover the costs of maps. See Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975) (approving textbook loans, but not other additional materials). The
Court's delicate analysis provokes the following question: Could government fund the costs of
atlases for parochial schools?
132 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988) (stating that monitoring the
federal monies of the Adolescent Family Life Act "presents us with yet another 'Catch-22'
argument: the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the
statute invalid" (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
133 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); see also supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
134 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135 See supra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
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disestablishment cannot be sustained consistently with our fundamental
commitment to liberalism.
36
Fortunately, the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence
presents a narrower reading of the clause's restrictions. However, teasing
out exactly what those restrictions are is difficult because the Court
proffers different doctrinal tests for disestablishment, depending upon
which test musters enough votes in a particular case or context. Roughly
speaking, the Court employs an "endorsement" version and a "formal
neutrality" version of the doctrinal test for disestablishment.
37
Unfortunately, both tests still retain the prohibition on regulations that are
based on sectarian motives. 38 In doing this, both tests are still misguided.
To be sure, under either disestablishment test a regulation need not
possess an exclusively secular purpose. If the secular purpose "happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions," then the
136 In fairness to the Court at this time, it did recognize the doctrinal difficulties generated
by maintaining an expansive reading of disestablishment and a robust reading of free exercise,
and it attempted to answer them. Justice Brennan, for example, wrote:
[N]othing in the Establishment Clause forbids the application of legislation having
purely secular ends in such a way as to alleviate burdens upon the free exercise of an
individual's religious beliefs. Surely the Framers would never have understood that
such a construction sanctions that involvement which violates the Establishment
Clause.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). But this response merely
begs the question because of the use of wordplay. Instead of blinking reality and calling the
protection of free exercise "secular," why not to realize instead that the Framers would never
have understood or agreed to this expansive construction of disestablishment.
137 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, _ U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2321
(2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When a court confronts a challenge to government-
sponsored speech or displays, I continue to believe that the endorsement test [] captures the
essential command of the Establishment Clause."). Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring), reinterpreted Lemon as follows:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render
the challenged practice invalid.
Id. For the formal neutrality test, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-09 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (retaining the purpose prong from Lemon but reinterpreting the effects prong as follows:
"In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that
is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a
broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion."). I do not mean to imply that
all members of the current Court have rejected the expansive restrictions of the traditional Lemon
test. See id. at 884 (Souter, Stevens, and Ginsberg, J.J., dissenting) (stating that "the basic
principle of establishment scrutiny of aid remains the principle as stated in Everson, that there
may be no public aid to religion or support for the religious mission of any institution").
138 See supra note 137.
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regulation is not unconstitutional on that ground. 139 But if a religious
purpose "predominates"' 140 the regulation, or if the regulation is "entirely
motivated"' 4' by a religious purpose, then the regulation violates the
Establishment Clause under either new test. Once again we see a
restatement of Locke's dualistic proviso against government regulation
based upon religious reasons. Like Locke's position, however, the current
Court's position makes the effective protection of free exercise an
anomaly, if not an impossibility. We have seen that a more robust theory
of religious tolerance requires a presumption against government
regulation. If government burdens religious exercise, the government must
lift that burden in the absence of a compelling interest to do otherwise.
The reasons for government lifting the burden are, frankly, to protect
religious practice, and thus these reasons are predominately religious. It
blinks reality to hold otherwise, and moreover, it is unnecessary to do so.
On this last point, Justice Scalia's discontent with the "secular purpose"
prong of the test(s) is essentially correct:
We have said essentially the following: Government may not act with the
purpose of advancing religion, except when forced to do so by the Free
Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when eliminating existing
governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even
when merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious
practices, except that at some point (it is unclear where) intentional
accommodation results in the fostering of religion, which is of course
unconstitutional. 1
42
Whereas the requirement of a secular governmental purpose is
required by Locke's theory of religious tolerance, it is not required by
Mill's theory. Therefore, it should not be required by the Court's
disestablishment jurisprudence. For Mill, government regulation shall be
justified politically if it prevents harm to others and also may be justified if
it maintains the necessary diversity of lifestyles required for individual
autonomy. It is the regulation's effects-preventing harm or maintaining
diversity-not the rationales for the regulation, secular or sectarian, that
139 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
140 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
141 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
142 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to conclude that
"[g]iven the many hazards involved in assessing the subjective intent of governmental
decisionmakers, the first prong of Lemon is defensible, I think, only if the text of the
Establishment Clause demands it. That is surely not the case." Id. at 639.
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are important. 43  Undoubtedly, however, the candid protection of free
exercise requires the Court to abandon its secular purpose restriction.
44
The reinterpretation of the "effects" or "advancement" prong of the
Lemon test indicates most clearly the Court's recent shift to a less
expansive reading of establishment restrictions. Under the endorsement
version of disestablishment, some government regulations that advance
religion no longer violate the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor
wrote that "the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to
require invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.'
' 45
This is a marked change from the expansive requirements of the Lemon
test. 46  Instead, only government regulations that "have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement.., of religion" are
invalid under the advancement prong of the endorsement test.
41
Employing the endorsement test therefore inevitably leads to two
interrelated questions: (1) under what conditions does the government
communicate an endorsement of religion?; and (2) to whom must the
government communicate-who must receive and interpret the message?
Justice O'Connor stated that government practices communicate an
endorsement of religion if they "send[] a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
143 Indeed, counterintuitive consequences result from the strict enforcement of the secular
purpose prong. For example, the Free Exercise clause demands that an individual cannot be
barred from holding public office because of her religion. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
629 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). If, however, enough like-minded individuals are elected
and vote their consciences, the resulting regulation would be unconstitutional under the secular
purpose prong of disestablishment, even if the regulation prevented harm to others. See
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We surely would not strike down a law
providing money to feed the hungry or shelter the homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but
for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would not have been approved.").
144 Accordingly, those regulations struck down by the Court only on the ground that they
possessed a predominately religious purpose are wrongly decided. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at
596-97; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60-61; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). Indeed, the
problem with public school prayer cases is not that such prayer (or curriculum) violates
establishment properly understood. Instead, the problem with public school prayer is that it
violates the free exercise rights of students properly understood. Consider Justice Thomas's
dissenting opinion in Newdow in which he stated that "the Pledge policy is not implicated by any
sensible incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which would probably cover little more than
the Free Exercise Clause." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2328
(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, because Justice Thomas also adhered to the
understanding of free exercise protections put forward in Smith, he proceeded to conclude
incorrectly that the Pledge policy "does not infringe any free-exercise rights." Id. at 2330.
145 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
14" -Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
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members of the political community."' 148 The problem, however, remains
in defining what constitutes outsider or insider status. Does the mere
feeling of being an outsider or an insider suffice? Do any outsider's or
insider's feelings count? If so, any government regulation concerning
religion arguably results in some citizens feeling as though they are
outsiders and others feeling as though they are insiders. This reading of
endorsement seems as broad as the Court's early establishment
jurisprudence, which we have seen results in inadequate protections for
religious liberty. More important for our purposes, we have seen that
under Mill's harm principle the feelings of citizens, what Mill deemed
"likings and dislikings,"' 149 are not adequate grounds for the justification of
government regulation. To justify political regulation there must be a
dimension of preventing harm to others, and the feelings of others do not
count as harm. 50 If, on the other hand, endorsement means something
more, namely that government puts in place some form of sanctions or
penalties backed by the force of law-viz., those citizens that the
regulation penalizes are "outsiders" and those who are not are "insiders"-
then only the most imprecise use of language allows us to claim that
government is sending a "message" of endorsement. In this scenario,
government is sending a sheriff, not a message.
To be sure, Justice O'Connor qualified the conditions under which
government practices send messages endorsing religion. We are informed
that we must view the regulation or practice in the proper context, couched
in the proper history, and with a proper understanding of the requirements
of free exercise. 5' Additionally, only a certain type of observer can
properly determine whether the practice sends a message of endorsement.
Not surprisingly, the proper observer, what Justice O'Connor termed the
"reasonable observer," is one who is armed with the proper context,
history, and free exercise jurisprudence necessary to decipher the message
of endorsement. 52 Justice O'Connor wrote that "the 'reasonable observer'
must embody a community ideal of social judgment, as well as rational
judgment, the test does not evaluate a practice in isolation from its origins
and context."' 5 3 But these "limiting" conditions for endorsement create
their own problems. For example, government messages that possess a
148 Id. at 688.
149 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
1so See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
151 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625-32 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
152 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2322 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
153 Id. (emphasis added).
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long history of being transmitted and are well-known to all, what Justice
O'Connor termed the messages' "history and ubiquity,"'' 54 are not viewed
as endorsements of religion to the "community ideal of social
judgment."1 55  However, "novel or uncommon references to religion,"
Justice O'Connor continued, "can more easily be perceived as government
endorsements because the reasonable observer cannot be presumed to be
fully familiar with their origins."'156 Accordingly, government regulations
or practices addressing majority religions and practices are unlikely to be
viewed as endorsements by the community ideal. On the other hand,
government practices or regulations addressing minority religions, or novel
religious expression and practice, are more readily viewed as endorsements
by the community ideal. This understanding of disestablishment, which is
protecting majority religions at the expense of their minority and novel
counterparts, is not acceptable as a general theory of religious liberty.
Such approach is directly contradicted by Mill's concern with maintaining
the necessary conditions for individual autonomy, including protecting the
lifestyles of religious minorities that a liberal state requires.
1 57
Under the "formal neutrality" version of disestablishment, we see
again that some government regulations that would have been an
advancement of religion under the Lemon test no longer violate the
Establishment Clause. 58 Specifically in the areas of governmental funding
and access to governmental property, the formal neutrality version of
disestablishment requires only that the aid or access be "offered to a broad
154 Id at 2323.
155 Id. at 2322.
156 Id. at 2323.
157 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text. Interestingly, other members of the
Court found the endorsement test too protective of minority religions at the expense of majority
religions. For example, Justice Kennedy wrote:
[T]he very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the
objective observer, easily lends itself to this type of inquiry .... creat[ing] classes of
religions based on the relative numbers of their adherents. Those religions enjoying
the largest following must be consigned to the status of least favored faiths so as to
avoid any possible risk of offending members of minority religions.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This again illustrates that basing the
advancement prong of disestablishment on the feelings of citizens, even if it is based on the
perceptions of the ideal citizen, who ever that may be, does not result in a workable theory of
protection for religious liberty, be it majority or minority religious liberties.
158 Compare Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-98 (1985), and Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-14 (1985) (employing Lemon test to find Title I of the Education
Act, funding public school teachers to provide remedial education at parochial schools,
unconstitutional entanglement with and advancement of religion), with Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (overruling Ball and Aguilar in pertinent part because "the aid is allocated
on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made
available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis").
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range of groups or persons without regard to their religion" in order to
avoid the improper advancement of religion.' 59 Under the restrictions of
formal neutrality, government aid or access does not have to effect or
advance religious and nonreligious institutions equally. Indeed, if that was
required by governmental neutrality it would no longer be "formal" and it
would be impossible to achieve in practice. Alan Schwarz correctly noted
that "equal aid results in unequal benefits and if equal benefits cannot in
practice be realized then any aid will increase the power of some churches
more than others, and often the church that benefits most is the one which
is already closest to dominance."' 60  To avoid this difficulty, the formal
neutrality version of disestablishment requires only that government have
the intention to effect or advance religious and nonreligious institutions
equally.16 1  The road to hell, of course, is said to be paved with good
intentions.
The formal neutrality version of disestablishment is corollary to the
Court's current doctrine of free exercise. We have seen in the context of
free exercise that if government regulation is neutral and generally
applicable, then no free exercise claim can lie. 162 We also determined that
this analysis offered inadequate protection for religious liberty.' 63  Now,
we see that if government benefits are neutral and generally available, then
no Establishment Clause claim can lie. This too is an inadequate analysis
of disestablishment concerns. The problem in both contexts is that the
effects of government regulation on religion are essentially ignored. If
government regulation severely burdens religious practice, formal
neutrality must be rejected because that effect does create a constitutional
concern under the Free Exercise Clause. If government regulation
provides substantial aid to dominant churches and not to minority
churches, formal neutrality must be rejected because that effect does create
a constitutional concern under the Establishment Clause. Employing
formal neutrality as the central value of the Religion Clauses, though
159 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion).
16o Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE
L.J. 692, 722 (1968).
161 This formal understanding of governmental neutrality explains why the plurality opinion
in Mitchell is not concerned with the actual effect, even divertible effect, of the aid for religious
uses. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820.
So long as the governmental aid is not itself 'unsuitable for use in the public schools
because of religious content,' and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally
permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the
government and is thus not of constitutional concern.
Id. (citations omitted).
162 See supra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text.163 See supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
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arguably a gain in doctrinal consistency, comes at the cost of religious
liberty because under this doctrine the effects of government regulation on
religion are not even relevant. The Court's recent move to formal
neutrality is still firmly caught in the throes of Locke's dualism. 1
64
Although both the endorsement version and the formal neutrality
version of disestablishment are correct in rejecting the expansive reading
of the Court's early Establishment Clause jurisprudence, neither theory
properly identifies the type of government regulation that constitutes an
improper advancement of religion. To identify what actually does
constitute an improper advancement of religion, we must return to the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test, which, ironically, has been all but
forgotten by the Court's recent shift in establishment jurisprudence. 165 The
key to understanding government's improper advancement of religion is to
recognize that establishment primarily addresses the institutional effects of
government regulation in the context of Church and State. The institutions
of Church and State must remain separate and un-entangled, at least when
it comes to sharing their essential defining powers. The most obvious
entanglement of governmental powers with a religious institution would be
for government to delegate its regulatory power to a church.
66
Accordingly, cases such as Larkin v. Grendel's Den167 are central to
understanding the proper restrictions of the entanglement prong of
disestablishment. In Grendel's Den, government effectively delegated to
the Catholic Church governmental power to veto certain liquor license
applications. 168 Here, there is the real risk of government regulation being
based on the "notions of morality, taste, or propriety"' 69 of a particular
church rather than on the prevention of harm to others or the maintenance
of alternative lifestyles. The Court correctly noted that "[t]his statute
enmeshes churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers
164 See supra text accompanying note 37.
165 For the endorsement version of disestablishment, entanglement is seen as essentially a
redundant inquiry into the "advancement effect" of government regulation. See Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) ("Regardless of how we have characterized the issue, however,
the factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we
use to examine 'effect.' "). For the formal neutrality version of disestablishment, entanglement is
only relevant to the primary inquiry into a regulation's "advancement effect." See, e.g., Mitchell,
530 U.S. at 807-08 ("we acknowledged that our cases discussing excessive entanglement had
applied many of the same considerations as had our cases discussing primary effect, and we
therefore recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a
statute's effect.").
166 Of course, the converse is also troubling in cases where government institutions are
delegated the sectarian powers to determine religious doctrine for religious institutions.
167 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
161 Id. at 122.
169 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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contrary to our consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause; '[t]he
objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [Church or
State] into the precincts of the other.' ,,70
Note that the Court in Grendel's Den was concerned by a religious
institution exercising the traditional powers of a secular governmental
institution, not with government accommodation of religious practice. The
original entanglement prong of the Lemon test properly recognized this
commitment to separating the institutions of Church and State.' 71 The
difficulty with the Lemon test is that it also precluded government
regulations having a religious purpose or a religious effect even if the
regulation did not institutionally advance religion. 72  As we have seen,
once these additional restrictions are added to disestablishment the
protection of free exercise is jeopardized. 173 Instead, the proper course is
to maintain the institutional restrictions of disestablishment, that is to say,
the traditional powers of these institutions should not be shared, but
discard the secular purpose and traditional advancement doctrines. Then
we can also maintain, consistent with a shift to the robust protection of
religious liberty, the free exercise of religious adherents. Recognizing the
institutional dimension of establishment restrictions (preventing shared
institutional power between Church and State) and the individual
dimension of free exercise restrictions (preventing harm to others) allows
for a consistent and robust protection of religious liberty.
This analysis of the Court's current establishment jurisprudence leads
to two important caveats. First, neither Locke nor Mill directly addressed
our nation's concern with disestablishment primarily because England had,
and still has, an established church. Nevertheless, Mill's theory of robust
protection of individual agency, which included the robust protection of
the religious practice of individuals, is more aligned with the narrower
reading of establishment restrictions suggested above. A narrower reading
of disestablishment is required by the expansive reading of underlying free
exercise protections for religious adherents. Second, the determination of
when and under what conditions institutional entanglement between
Church and State exists will not always be readily apparent. While some
institutional entanglement is inevitable, much of the Court's current
170 Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 126; see also Steven D. Smith, Separation and the
"Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1018 (1989)
("The essential task of the establishment clause under a separation construction would be two-
fold: to prevent government from interfering in the internal affairs of religious institutions and,
conversely, to prohibit religious institutions from directly exercising governmental authority.").
171 Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 126 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
172 See supra notes 128, 130 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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establishment jurisprudence, such as its analysis of the creche cases, 7 4
clearly missed the mark because no institutional powers are shared or
advanced by the facts of those cases. Although the line between
government acknowledgement of religious institutions, which is
constitutional, and government empowerment of religious institutions,
which is arguably unconstitutional, is often murky, at least the concern
over institutional separation asks the right question: has government made
a law, the effects of which share the respective powers defining the
institutions of Church and State?
Once again this discussion has demonstrated that a shift to Mill's
theory of religious tolerance will have practical doctrinal consequences in
the context of disestablishment. If we shift our notion of religious
tolerance from Locke to Mill, then we must deemphasize, if not abandon,
the Court's current fascination with the secular purpose and formal
neutrality of government regulation. Instead, renewed doctrinal emphasis
should be placed on "excessive entanglement," the avoidance of
institutional entanglements between Church and State.
CONCLUSION
This essay began with the claim that there is an uneasy alliance
between our national commitment to liberalism and our equally fundament
commitment to religious liberty. It has demonstrated that the underlying
uneasiness results in large part from the type of liberalism we are
committed to. Historically, we have been committed to a thin theory of
religious liberty primarily inherited from John Locke-protecting religious
belief but not religious practice. Consequently, we have been rudderless
with regards to distinguishing tolerant from intolerant religious
commitments. Locke's answer to our original question-when can we
stop tolerating the intolerant?-is, whenever government so chooses. All
outward behavior, tolerant or intolerant alike, is subject to a presumption
of government control. The Court's current Religion Clauses
jurisprudence, which is so heavily influenced by the thin theory of Locke,
is also rudderless and suffers from the same inability to distinguish tolerant
from intolerant religious commitments.
But, this is not the only theory of liberalism available. Indeed, this
essay has demonstrated that John Stuart Mill presented us with a sounder
view of liberalism in general, and a sounder view of the protections
required for religious liberty in particular. Mill's answer to our original
174 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984).
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question-when can we stop tolerating the intolerant?-is, when there is
imminent harm to others. Actions harming others are intolerant actions,
and only these actions are subject to the presumption of government
regulation. Implementing Mill's brand of liberalism requires us to redefine
our notion of tolerance to include the right of religious adherents to act out,
and on, their interests as well as to exclude the moral distress of others as
grounds for political regulation of individual lifestyles. Mill's theory
reunited the essential aspects of individual agency to include a
presumption against government regulation of both belief and lifestyle. Of
course, this presumption is limited by the harm to others and by a like
liberty for all.
We also have seen that if we do implement Mill's brand of liberalism
it will require the Court to return to prior case law and to a burden analysis
in the context of free exercise jurisprudence. It will also require the Court
to abandon its fascination with secularism and neutrality that consumes the
doctrinal tests in the context of disestablishment. Mill's theory
recommended a renewed commitment to institutional separation, but this is
not equivalent to a commitment to secularism.
When religious adherents request our tolerance of their religious
lifestyles, the answer we give reflects more on our underlying political
commitments than on the particular religion or lifestyle in question. The
correct response is that we should tolerate alternative lifestyles, even those
that do not tolerate others, so long as there is no evidence of harm to
others. When religious institutions request government support or access,
the correct response is to tolerate support and access for religious
institutions, so long as there is little danger of delegating governmental
powers to them or sectarian powers to the government. These are
significant and difficult political commitments for any liberal society to
enforce, especially at this time of heightened conflict and concern over
religious intolerance. I believe that this nation's underlying fundamental
commitment to individual autonomy and agency requires no less from us.
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